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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. WICKES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12598 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMP ANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover $10,000 as the "death 
benefit" claimed to be owing to the plaintiff as beneficiary 
under an automobile insurance policy issued by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff and her deceased husband, Homer 
W. Wickes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both parties moved for Summary Judgment in the 
lower court based upon all the pleadings and all other 
documents in the file, including Interrogatories, Request 
for Admissions and Answers thereto, Affidavits and dep-
1 
ositions. The District Court, by the Honorable D. Frank 
\\lilkins, granted the defendant's Motion for Summa 
Judgment of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and deni~ 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant and respondent seeks affirmance of 
the Judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the most part, defendant agrees with the state· 
ment of facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief. However, 
there are some additional facts that should be set forth 
and some clarification made of certain other claimed facts. 
Defendant submits that this is an uncomplicated case 
both factually and legally although it is conceded that it 
is an unfortunate case from the plaintiff's standpoint in 
that there unquestionably was $10,000 that the plaintiff 
could have realized upon as a death benefit under an auto· 
mobile policy issued by the defendant had a premium been 
paid eight days earlier than it was paid. This is all the 
more unfortunate because the uncontradicted evidence is 
that State Farm's Sales Agent James G. Starbuck had a 
telephone conversation with plaintiff's son, James R. 
Wickes, who was then acting for the plaintiff, and urged 
that the premium be paid at a time when there was still 
six days left in which it could be paid and the $10,000 
collected (Affidavit of James G. Starbuck, para. 6). 
Nevertheless, the premium was not paid at that time. For 
reasons that had nothing to do with defendant, State Farm, 
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the check for the premium payment was not put in the 
mail to State Farm until 16 days after the expiration date 
of the policy and not received by State Farm until two 
days later or 18 days after the expiration date of the policy. 
Plaintiff's failure to pay the premium in time was un-
fortunate. Certain of her other problems disclosed in her 
brief were tragic. Not only did she lose her husband in 
this automobile accident of August 2, 1969, but as pointed 
out by her attorney in her brief and "while not appearing 
in the record," her son James R. Wickes was killed in a 
plane crash subsequent to his deposition being taken in 
this case. On the somewhat more positive side to these 
tragedies, although also "not appearing in the record," 
is the fact that Mrs. Wickes' husband's death resulted from 
an accident involving another State Farm insured with 
high liability coverage and the claim for Mr. Wickes' 
death was settled by State Farm's payment to his heirs, in-
cluding Mrs. Wickes, of $60,000. 
There is no question in this case but that the State 
Farm policy in question expired, according to its terms, at 
midnight on August 1, 1969, and prior to Homer W. 
Wickes' accident or death. (Copy of policy is attached to 
Request for Admissions and genuineness thereof is ad-
mitted in Answers to Request for Admissions.) It is also 
conceded that no premium was paid or tendered to State 
Farm following the expiration date of the policy and until 
August 16, 1969 when plaintiff's $48 check was mailed to 
Agent Starbuck by plaintiff's son from Phoenix, Arizona 
and was received by Starbuck on August 18, 1969 (Affi-
davit of Starbuck, para. 8 and Exhibit "A" attached there-
to). 
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The return address of the envelope in which this 
check was sent indicated the insured's new address was 
"Betty Wickes, 6547 North, 44th Ave., Glendale, Ariz. 
85301." In the letter accompanying the check, James 
Wickes advised that the $48 was for payment of the in-
surance on the 1962 Olds, this being the vehicle Mrs. 
Wickes had taken to Arizona. He further advised Mr. 
Starbuck that the policy should be issued only in Mrs. 
Wickes' name and his father's name should be deleted 
from the policy (Affidavit of Starbuck and Exhibit "A" 
attached thereto). 
Both Mrs. Betty Wickes and James Wickes testified 
that they were very concerned following Mr. Wickes' 
death and at the time the $48 premium was mailed by 
James Wickes on August 16, 1969 that there be coverage 
with State Farm on the 1962 Oldsmobile for the future 
(Betty Wickes' deposition, pages 7, 14, 15, 16 and 22 and 
James R. Wickes' deposition, page 27). Defendant sub· 
mits that this concern is of considerable importance in this 
case and their testimony relating to it will be referred to 
in more detail under the Argument in Point Ill of this 
brief. 
After receiving the $48 premium on August 18, 1969, 
Agent Starbuck sent the same to State Farm's Greeley, 
Colorado office which then serviced all State Farm policy· 
holders in Utah, Arizona and several other Western 
States (Affidavit of Starbuck, para. 8). Thereafter, State 
Farm issued to Mrs. Wickes a new policy effective on the 
date Agent Starbuck had received the premium (Affidavit 
of A. F. Smith, para. 4). As requested by Mrs. Wickes, 
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the new policy contained all the coverage afforded by the 
old policy including "S Coverage," and it was issued to 
her at her new address in Glendale, Arizona. The new 
policy period was August 18, 1969 to the next regular 
expiration date, February 1, 1970. Since premiums on 
automobile insurance policies in Arizona were slightly 
higher than in Utah, there was no refund on the $48 even 
though the policy was out of force for 17 days during the 
six-month policy period (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, para. 4). 
In the usual case of this kind, the insured is contend-
ing that the agents or representatives of the insurance 
company said or did something during the period while 
there was still an opportunity to pay the premium and 
keep continuous coverage that induced or caused the in-
sured not to pay and which serves as an excuse for late 
payment. There are no facts to support that kind of a 
claim in this case. In fact, the only contact between plain-
tiff or her family and State Farm's representatives prior 
to August 10, 1969, (which is the expiration date of the 
policy in question, plus ten days) and upon which such 
a claim might be predicated, is completely unfavorable to 
the plaintiff's position. This is the telephone conversa-
tion between Agent Starbuck and James R. Wickes that 
both acknowledge took place on Monday, August 4, 1969. 
When one reads the Affidavit of Starbuck and the testi-
mony of James R. Wickes in his deposition, it will be seen 
that there is very little in dispute as between these two 
as to what was said about payment of the premium and 
the "S Coverage." James Wickes admitted that after he 
telephoned Starbuck on Monday, August 4th, and told 
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the latter of his father's death in an accident the preceding 
Saturday (Starbuck did not know of the accident before 
the call) that Starbuck brought up the subject of "S Cov. 
erage" and the death indemnity and told James Wickes 
that there was an amount that then could be paid to his 
mother by reason of the death of his father (James R. 
Wickes' deposition, pages 9 and 10). James Wickes said 
he wasn't sure whether Starbuck mentioned a figure of 
$10,000 or $5,000 as constituting the amount of the in-
demnity. It is true that James Wickes did not flatly admit 
that in this conversation Starbuck warned him that the 
premium was then overdue and had to be paid within 
ten days from August 1st or the coverage would be lost 
and the indemnity not paid. This, among other things, is 
what Starbuck swears he told James Wickes during this 
conversation (Affidavit of Starbuck, para. 6). However, 
James Wickes did admit that Starbuck could have told 
him this during the conversation (James R. Wickes' depo· 
sition, page 12), and he further admitted that if this is 
what Starbuck states was said in this conversation, that he 
"wouldn't be able to agree or disagree" with such a claim 
(James R. Wickes' deposition, page 13 and see also his 
deposition at pages 19 and 30). Certainly there is no 
claim by James Wickes, the plaintiff, or anyone else that 
Starbuck mislead them in to believing that the Wickes 
had more than ten days from August 1st to pay the 
premium. 
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In support of her claim that she didn't have to pay 
the premium by August 10, 1969, and could still have con-
tinuous coverage, plaintiff relies upon claimed represen-
tations made to her by a State Farm sales agent in Ari-
zona named Osborne. More will be said about this claim 
under Point III. of this brief. However, it should be kept 
in mind that Mrs. Wickes contacted Osborne for the first 
time on September 3, 1969, after she had received a State 
Farm notice the day before that raised a question in her 
mind as to whether her $48 check mailed on August 16th 
had been received and whether she then had coverage in 
Arizona on the 1962 Olds. She had then telephoned her 
son James, and he had directed her to get in contact with a 
State Farm agent in Arizona (Betty Wickes' deposition, 
page 14). She had selected Osborne by looking in the tele-
phone directory and finding he was the closest agent to 
her home (Betty Wickes' deposition, page 17). Prior to 
this call being made upon him, Osborne had never seen 
nor talked to any of the Wickes, and he knew absolutely 
nothing about events involving the Wickes and State 
Farm prior thereto. After talking to Osborne and to be 
absolutely sure of having coverage, another $48 check was 
sent to State Farm. However, this check was returned un-
cashed to Mrs. Wickes since State Farm had already placed 
coverage upon its receipt of the earlier check. 
All of the facts indicate that in the heartache and 
confusion that followed the death of Homer W. Wickes, 
an unfortunate mistake was made and that neither Mrs. 
Wickes nor James R. Wickes paid prior to August 10th 
the premium that James Wickes had been told by Agent 
7 
Starbuck should be paid. The check was finally written 
out by Mrs. Wickes on August 13, 1969, and was appar. 
ently given by her to James Wickes on that date in Salt 
Lake City to be mailed. Although it is of little significance 
because late even then, it was not mailed until three days 
later and on August 16th from Phoenix. James Wickes 
admitted that what probably occurred was that he forgot 
to mail it in Salt Lake City and then did not mail it until 
after the family had arrived in Arizona (James Wickes' 
deposition, page 25). 
Some time later the plaintiff did make demand upon 
the defendant for the $10,000. The defendant investigat· 
ed and then denied liability on the grounds that the policy 
and coverage had expired on August 1, 1969, and since its 
offer to reinstate the policy within ten days from that date 
with no out of force period had not been accepted, that 
there could be no coverage for the death which occurred 
on August 2, 1969. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
"S COVERAGE" IS VEHICLE INSURANCE, NOT 
LIFE INSURANCE, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
STATUTORY 30-DA Y GRACE PERIOD REQUIRE· 
MENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE. 
Plaintiff's position under Point I. of her brief that 
we are dealing here with life insurance rather than ve· 
hide insurance and that therefore the 30-day grace period 
for life insurance must apply, is somewhat difficult to 
understand. This is so because of a provision of the Utah 
statutes found in the Insurance Code that deals expressly 
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with the very type of insurance involved in the "S Cover-
age" of the State Farm policy in question. This section of 
the statute reads as follows: 
31-11-6 'Vehicle Insurance' Defined - ( 1) Vehicle 
insurance is insurance against loss or damage to 
any land vehicle or aircraft or to property while 
contained therein or thereon, or being loaded or 
unloaded therein or therefrom, and against any 
loss or liability resulting from or incident to own-
ership, maintenance, or use of any such vehicle or 
aircraft. 
(2) Insurance against accidental death or accidental 
injury to persons while in, entering, alighting from, 
adjusting, repairing, cranking, or caused by being 
struck by a vehicle, or aircraft, when such insur-
ance is issued as part of insurance on the vehicle, 
or aircraft, shall be deemed to be vehicle insurance. 
(Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's brief, without quoting it, refers to the 
above section of the statute and attempts to downgrade its 
significance by stating that it is found in those statutes 
in the Insurance Code "relating to the amount of capital 
funds that insurance companies are to have prior to being 
allowed to transact business within the State of Utah," 
and that this chapter is "primarily concerned with what 
types of insurance companies are required to have what 
amounts of capital funds." In fact, this chapter of the 
Insurance Code is entitled "CAPITAL FUNDS REQUIR-
ED AND KINDS OF INSURANCE," and it is clear from 
reading all sections of the statutes contained therein that 
not only does it set forth the requirements for capital 
funds but that it also defines a number of different kinds 
of insurance. It is the only place in the Insurance Code 
9 
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30 days as far as "S Coverage" was concerned. Consider 
also the record keeping and notification difficulties that 
would be created. Instead of the insurer being able to 
send out expiration notices gi>ing a single uniform ex-
piration date for all coverages, a different type notice 
would be required for those policies ha>ing .. S Co>erage" 
so that the notice could differentiate between the normal 
expiration date for the other co•erages and the additional 
30-day grace period which applied to the .. S Co•erage." 
If this court were to hold that the .. S Co>erage" in-
voh-ed here is life insurance and not •ehicle insurance. 
then this would involve not only the 30-day grace period 
provisions of 31-22-2, but it might in>olYe other pro-
visions of Chapter 22 of the Insurance Code • 31-22-1 er. 
sc-q. CC.A .. 1953 1. This is so because 31-22-1 requires 
thJ.t 2.ll life- insurance policies issued in l:tah contain cer-
tain of the requirements set forth in Chapter 22. Included 
J.mong these sections of this chapter are requiremenrs for 
life insurance policies relating t0 inconresnbiliry. •31-
22-31 dividends. 131-22-61 policy loan. 1 31-22--· rein-
statement. '"- 1-22-9 1 and se•eral other seccions.. Some O£ 
all of thc-se provisions might be construed by a court ro 
3.pply ro such a coverage as .. S Co•erage·· ii it voere t::reare<l 
as life insurance rather than •ehicle insura.oce. It is ~ 
parent that the Legislature has determined dut the regula-
tion c,i life insurance policies and whicle in.sa.r.1.oce pol-
:c:es. including those ·with a coverage soch JS ··5 C.O.cr-
.ige ·. ::.re ro be rreJ.ted differently and gov~ ~ .~irrc=­
t'.l' rc-quirements. It is also apparent dut in on..~ ro iwi.i 
the- problc-ms that have been referred ro ilx-•e. ~ ~~ 
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ably a number of other problems, that the Legislature, 
in its judgment, enacted 31-11-6 (2) U.C.A., 1953, in. 
eluding the provision specifically stating that such cov-
erage would be deemed to be vehicle insurance. 
POINT II. 
LOSSES WHICH OCCURRED WITHIN TEN 
DAYS AFTER THE EXPIRATION DATE ARE NOT 
COVERED UNLESS THE PREMIUM WAS RECEIVED 
WITHIN THAT TIME. 
Plaintiff by Point II. of her brief is attempting to re· 
write the vehicle insurance contract that existed between 
herself, her late husband and State Farm by claiming, in 
effect, that the policy period was not six months but rath· 
er six months and ten days. 
As it relates to the policy period, the State Farm pol· 
icy in question provides as follows: 
The policy period shall be as shown under 'Poli~ 
Period' and for such succeeding periods of s11 
months each thereafter as the required renewal 
premium is paid by the insured on or before the 
expiration of the current policy period. The 'Pol· 
icy Period' shall begin and end at 12:01. A.M., 
standard time at the address of the named msured 
as stated herein. The premium shown is for the 
policy period and coverages indicated on page 1. 
(The foregoing is para. 1 of the Declarations on 
page 10 of the policy.) 
Policy Period Territory. This insurance applies to 
accidents du;ing the policy period which occur 
anywhere. 
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(The foregoing is para. 17 of the policy Condi-
tions relating to Insuring Agreement IV., [i.e. "S 
Coverage"} found on page 8 of the policy. Anoth-
er provision of Insuring Agreement IV. provides 
the Death Indemnity would be paid if the death 
occurs within 30 days from the date of the acci-
dent.) 
POLICY CONDITIONS - APPLICABLE TO 
ALL COVERAGES UNLESS OTHERWISE NOT-
ED 
* * * * * 
( 1) to continue such coverage in force until the 
expiration of the current policy, and 
(2) to renew this policy for the succeeding policy 
period, **** Such renewal shall be at the rates 
legally in effect at the time thereof. 
These agreements shall be void and of no effect: 
(a) If the premium for the policy is not paid when 
due;**** 
(The foregoing is found on pages 8 and 9 of the 
policy.) 
It is unquestioned that the policy period in question 
expired on August 1, 1969 (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, 
para. 2). There is nothing whatever in the policy that 
would indicate that there could be continuous coverage 
thereafter if the renewal premium were not paid by the 
expiration date. That is, no provision of the policy gives 
the policyholder the contractual right to keep continuous 
coverage by paying the premium within ten days after 
the expiration date. It is to be noted that the semi-annual 
premium notice (Affidavit of A. F. Smith and Exhibit 1 
attached thereto) which is mailed to the policyholder 30 
13 
days prior to the due or expiration date, makes no men-
tion of any ten-day period and advises the policyholder 
only that "payment by due date continues this policy in 
force for six months." 
The only notification a State Farm policyholder re-
ceives that he may pay within ten days after expiration 
and keep continuous coverage is given him in an expira-
tion notice (Affidavit of A. F. Smith and Exhibit 2 at-
tached thereto) which is referred to in plaintiff's brief and 
hereafter for simplicity sake as a "10-40 notice" and which 
is mailed three days after the expiration date and if the 
premium has not been received. This notice advises the 
policyholder as follows: 
To have continuous protection, make payment to 
the Company or a State Farm agent within 10 
days after policy due date. If payment is not made 
within 10 days after due date, but is made in less 
than 40 days, protection will be reinstated as of 
date payment is received by the Company, subject 
to established Company procedures. 
Plaintiff calls this ten-day period a "grace period" 
and contends that if the loss occurs during it, there is cov· 
erage regardless of premium payment also being made 
during the ten days. She further contends that even if the 
premium is never paid, there is still coverage and the 
premium is to be deducted from what is owed on the loss. 
Since State Farm's policy, which is its only contract with 
its insured, never even mentions any ten-day period and 
since no Utah statute requires any such period in a ve· 
hide insurance policy, it is difficult to understand how 
this can be called a "grace period" as plaintiff claims the 
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authorities define that term. Rather, it is apparent from 
elementary principles of contract law (Reinstatement of 
the Law of Contracts, section 24) that what is involved is 
an offer by State Farm to its insured which may be accept-
ed by the insured according to its terms but if not accepted 
has no legal significance. 
Defendant has been able to find two cases which are 
closely in point to the instant case including the issue in-
volved in Point II. of this brief. These are: McClure v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 S.E.2d 
475 (Georgia 1966) and State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Robison, 461 P.2d 520 (Ariz. 1970). 
Plaintiff's counsel cites these cases in his brief but dis-
misses them as "poorly reasoned." It is submitted that 
they are well reasoned and that they place an interpreta-
tion on the ten-day period that is the only logical one that 
can be given it. 
In the McClure v. State Farm case Mrs. McClure's 
policy included a coverage for a $5,000 accidental death 
indemnity and her son James was an insured under this 
coverage. The policy expired on July 18, 1963. James 
was killed on July 26, 1963, and it appeared that the re-
newal premium was not paid by Mrs. McClure until 
August 2, 1963. She sued State Farm for the $5,000 and 
the trial court granted a Summary Judgment for State 
Farm which the appellate court affirmed. The court in 
the McClure case indicates that she had received a notice 
from State Farm similar to the "10-40 notice" in this 
case. The argument was made there as it is being made 
by plaintiff here that the overall effect was to make this 
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ten days into a "grace period" and that there was cover-
age during that period even though the premium pay-
ment was made later. Concerning this contention, the 
court stated as follows at 148 S.E.2d page 477: 
We think this position is untenable. There is no 
provision for a 'grace' period in the policy. The 
policy of the company to provide continuous pro-
tection if the premium was paid within 10 days 
after the expiration date of the policy constituted 
an offer by the insurance company to the insured 
which required acceptance of the insured by the 
actual payment of the premium, or part thereof, 
possibly, in order to constitute a contract. There is 
no showing in this case whatsoever that the pre-
mium was paid or tendered to the insurance com-
pany within the 10 day period in which continuous 
protection could be procured. Neither is there 
any fraud alleged against the insurance company, 
nor any other fact, which in law could be said to 
have deterred the plaintiff from paying the pre-
mium within the said 10 day period. The rule 
which applies to an event's occurring within a 
'grace' period provided in an insurance policy does 
not apply in such a case as this where there is no 
binding contract on the part of the insurance com· 
pany to pay a loss occurring within the 'grace' per· 
iod. The situation in this case is that the insurance 
company offered the insured the opportunity to 
buy and pay for protection during the 1.0 day pe~· 
iod by the actual payment of the premmm. This 
off er the insured did not accept and it follows that 
the insurance company was not obligated to pay 
the loss under count 1. 
In the State Farm v. Robison case, the insured, Mrs. 
Robison, had a State Farm automobile policy which ex· 
pired on May 18, 1964. On May 22, 1964, Mrs. Robison 
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was involved in an automobile accident which involved 
certain coverages of the policy. Mrs. Robison knew that 
she had ten days following May 18th or until midnight on 
May 27th within which to pay the premium and keep con-
tinuous coverage. However, for various reasons detailed 
in the opinion, Mrs. Robison did not end up tendering 
the check to State Farm until June 15, 1964. Primarily 
based on facts which it believed gave rise to an estoppel as 
against State Farm, the trial court found coverage but the 
appellate court reversed and held there was none. As in 
the McClure case and in the instant case, Mrs. Robison's 
attorney contended that the ten-day period was a "grace 
period." On this subject matter, the Court stated as fol-
lows at 461 P.2d pages 523 and 524: 
Initially, we consider it necessary to clarify the 
legal effect of the following provision in the ex-
piration notice sent to the insured: 
'Payment within 10 days after due date 
will reinstate your policy as of the pol-
icy due date.' 
It is not disputed that it was the policy of the com-
pany to provide continuous protection if the pre-
mium was paid within this 10 day period. * * * * 
No grace period exists unless there is either a 
statutory provision or a provision in the contract 
of insurance. Sahlin v. American Casualty Com-
pany of Reading, Pennsylvania, 103 Ariz. 57, 
436 P.2d 606 (1968). Here, the policy did not pro-
vide for a grace period and the Arizona statutes 
require none. Mrs. Robison's loss, therefore, can-
not be construed as one occurring during a 'grace' 
period. 
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Under Point II. of her brief, plaintiff cites a number 
of authorities which she claims support her position. A 
reading of these authorities will show that none of them 
is specifically in point to the instant case. The issue be-
fore the Court here is whether the insurer is liable where 
the loss occurs during a period following the expiration 
date and during which payment may be made to provide 
continuous coverage, but where the payment is made or 
tendered after this period. These are the facts involved 
in the instant case and which were involved in both the 
McClure and Robison cases. Defendant has found no 
other cases involving that specific fact situation and it is 
not the one involved in any of the authorities cited by 
the plaintiff. 
Defendant will hereafter consider plaintiff's authori-
ties cited in her brief and will point out wherein they are 
distinguishable from this case. 
The definition of "grace period" which is quoted 
from Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition by plaintiff 
gives her no help since if applied here, would exclude 
coverage because the premium was not paid during the 
ten-day period. Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Co., 
155 P.2d 173, involved the interpretation of a life insur-
ance policy and whether the death resulted from injury 
or disease. No question of late payment of premium or 
grace period is involved in it. Perhaps it was cited only 
for the generality quoted from it on page 13 of plaintiff's 
brief which favors liberal construction of insurance pol-
icies in favor of the insured. Even on this remote basis, 
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it is difficult to fathom what the provisions of the policy 
in question are here and for which plaintiff seeks such a 
liberal construction. 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sections 7960 
and 7961, is cited for the general rule "that if the insured 
dies during the grace period, his death is covered." One 
problem with this being pertinent to the instant case is 
that Appleman is talking about life insurance and policies 
in which there unquestionably was a grace period. No 
cases are cited by Appleman in those sections which would 
support the proposition urged here by the plaintiff and 
which would lend weight to the argument that ten days 
should be added to this policy of vehicle insurance as a 
grace period. Moreover, a reading of the cases cited by 
Appleman in support of the proposition quoted by the 
plaintiff in her brief demonstrates that most involve a fact 
situation where not only the loss occurred in the grace 
period but where the premium was also paid or tendered 
during that period. 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Colquitt, 168 
So. 2d 251, cited by plaintiff on page 13 of her brief, in-
volved a loss occurring on February 20th after the Feb-
ruary 15th expiration date of the policy and where the 
court ordered the amount of the loss paid less the premium 
which had not been paid. However, the critical distinction 
between that case and the instant one is that the policy 
itself expressly granted the insured "a grace period of ten 
( 10) days." 
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Meadows v. Continental Assurance Co., 89 F.2d 256, 
cited by plaintiff on page 14 of her brief is claimed by 
plaintiff to have "held that where the death of the in-
sured occurred during the grace period, the policy must 
be paid, less the amount of any premiums owing to the 
company by the insured." This was neither holding nor 
dicta in that case and, in fact, the insurance company and 
not the beneficiary of the insured was the prevailing party 
there both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. 
The life insurance policy involved in the Meadows case 
did have an express provision in it which provided essenti-
ally as has been quoted from the plaintiff's brief, but the 
issue decided by the court there related to an interpreta-
tion of the word "default" in the policy and is totally un-
related to what is involved here. 
Pickens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 144 S.E.2d 68 (So. Carolina 1965) is cited by plain-
tiff on page 13 of her brief, and it is claimed to represent 
the "weight of authority, and the better reasoned view," 
presumably in support of plaintiff's contention that the 
ten-day period is a "grace period." Although the Pickens 
case is at least somewhat similar factually to the instant 
case, it is of no help whatever to plaintiff's contention 
under Point II. of her brief and actually is more suppor-
tive of defendant's position than plaintiff's. 
In the Pickens case, a death indemnity was involved 
under a vehicle policy and the death of the insured oc-
curred after the expiration of the policy but within ten 
days. There, as here, State Farm had sent the insured an 
expiration notice within a day or two after the expiration 
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date advising that continuous protection could be had if 
the premium was paid within ten days. The crucial dis-
tinction between that case and the instant one is that the 
court held in Pickens that there was a jury issue as to 
whether a tender of the premium to State Farm had been 
made by the brother of the deceased within the ten days. 
Obviously, we would have quite a different case here if 
the Wickes were claiming that they had paid or tendered 
the premium within the ten days. In the Pickens case, 
State Farm contended that since the ten-day provision was 
not in the policy and was merely an offer which had to be 
accepted by the deceased during his lifetime, that there 
was no acceptance of the off er and no obligation to pay 
even assuming the tender by the brother of the premium 
within the ten days. State Farm makes no such contention 
here and the facts are completely distinguishable. In the 
Pickens case and concerning this ten-day period which 
expired on March 12th, the court stated the following at 
144 S.E. 2d page 71: 
Contrary to the contention of the appellant that 
the expiration notice was merely an offer to renew, 
which required the acceptance of Pickens during 
this lifetime, we think the language of the notice 
is indicative of an intention on the part of the ap-
pellant to give Pickens through March 12 to pay 
the premium, and to afford him continuous pro-
tection in the meantime, provided the premium he 
paid within the time allowed. (Emphasis added). 
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POINT III. 
NO WAIVER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE 
PREMIUM OCCURRED BY ACCEPTANCE OF IT 
AFTER NOTICE OF THE LOSS SINCE NO PART OF 
THE PREMIUM PAID WAS EVER APPLIED TO THE 
PERIOD OF THE LOSS AND IT WAS ONLY APPLIED 
FOR FUTURE COVERAGE FROM THE DA TE RE-
CEIVED. 
Plaintiff argues in Point III. of her brief that the "10-
40 notice" is immaterial and its terms irrelevant to the 
disposition of this case. She goes on to contend that de-
fendant's reliance on the "10-40 notice" is misplaced be-
cause this is an attempt by defendant to vary the terms 
of the policy in a way not permitted by statutes or the 
policy. Finally, plaintiff concludes from this that since 
we are to act as if this notice never existed or was sent, 
that the action of State Farm in accepting the premium on 
August 18, 1969, constitutes a waiver of the policy terms 
requiring prompt payment. By this reasoning, which 
plaintiff states is an alternative to her theory in Point II. 
that the "10-40 notice" created a "grace period", plain-
tiff concludes that there was coverage on August 2, 1969 
when Homer W. Wickes was killed. 
Plaintiff gains nothing whatever in claiming cover-
age for August 2nd if we disregard entirely the "10-40 
notice." This is so because there is absolutely nothing that 
State Farm or its representatives are claimed to have said 
or done up to the time the premium was received on Aug-
ust 18th that could possibly be said to have led Mrs. 
Wickes to believe that the defendant's acceptance of the 
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premmm on that date was a waiver of the policy pro-
v1s10ns requiring prompt payment or no coverage. An 
eminent authority has defined "waiver" as follows: 
****Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of 
a known right; it is the expression of an intention 
not to insist upon what the law affords. It is con-
sensual in its nature; the intention may be in-
ferred from conduct, and the knowledge may be 
actual or constructive, but both knowledge and in-
tent are essential elements. Prosser, The Making of 
a Contract of Insurance in Minnesota, 17 Minn. 
L. Rev. 567, 594. 
When one examines all of the facts in this record it 
can be seen that plaintiff's argument on "waiver" and for 
continuous coverage from August 2nd forward cannot 
possibly be sustained. Let us examine the facts and see if 
State Farm's acceptance of this premium constituted an 
"intentional relinquishment" of its right to be paid 
promptly or an indication of that Company's "intention 
not to insist on what the law affords." 
It would be of some assistance to plaintiff on her 
waiver theory if State Farm had on one or more occasions 
prior to August 18, 1969 accepted a late premium after 
the ten days from the expiration date and still granted 
continuous coverage. However, no such instance has been 
cited by plaintiff as having occurred during the approxi-
mately four years of coverage which the family had with 
State Farm prior to August 1, 1969. To the contrary, the 
record indicates that in all instances before that date when 
the Wickes did pay their premium more than ten days 
after the expiration date, that they were never given con-
tinuous coverage but that there was an out of force period. 
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Agent Starbuck recalled that this had occurred on two 
occasions prior to August 1, 1969. (Affidavit of James G. 
Starbuck, para. 3). Also, it is significant that the last 
premium that was paid by the Wickes before August 1, 
1969, was paid late on February 18, 1969 (rather than 
February 1, 1969, the expiration date of that policy) and 
at that time the policy was only reinstated on the date pay-
ment was received and to run to the end of the regular 
six-month period which ended August 1, 1969. Since the 
policy was out of force from February 2nd through Feb-
ruary 17, 1969, an amount of $4.20 representing the ~re­
mium for the out of force period was refunded to the 
Wickes at that time (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, para. 3). 
Thus, not only are the Wickes unable to factually support 
a claim that their prior experience with State Farm could 
have led them to expect continuous coverage when the 
premium was paid on August 18, 1969, but the very re· 
verse is true. Their most recent experience in paying a 
premium should have caused them to expect that State 
Farm would handle the August premium and coverage 
just as it had the preceding February and this is exactly 
the way they were handled. 
The Wickes make no claim that anything occurred 
during the ten days following the August 1, expiration 
date that could be used by plaintiff as a basis for her claim 
of waiver. To the contrary again, and as pointed out in 
the Statement of Facts portion of this brief, the only con-
tact with State Farm during that period is unfavorable 
to plaintiff's position. This was James Wickes' telephone 
conversation with Agent Starbuck. The latter's testimony 
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in his affidavit is that he told James Wickes the premium 
payment was then overdue and had to be paid within ten 
days from August 1st or the death benefit would be lost 
(Affidavit of James G. Starbuck, para. 6). James Wickes 
neither admitted nor denied that he was told this and said 
he simply couldn't remember (James R. Wickes' depo-
sition, pages 13, 19 and 20). James Wickes did admit 
that within a day or two after his returning to Salt Lake 
City on August 3, 1969, that he found at the church among 
his father's papers the "semiannual premium notice" 
which is Exhibit I to A. F. Smith's Affidavit and marked. 
Exhibit I and 2 to the deposition of James R. Wickes 
(James R. Wickes' deposition, pages 17 and 18). This 
notice advised that the premium had to be paid by August 
1, 1969. James Wickes admitted that during the ten days 
following August 1, 1969 that he became aware that the 
premium on the 1962 Olds was then overdue and that he 
knew this either from his telephone conversation with 
Starbuck or from the premium notice (James R. Wickes' 
deposition, page 22). During this period, James Wickes 
did have a notion that there was some period of time after 
the expiration date during which the premium could be 
paid and still have continuous coverage. However, he 
didn't know just how long this was although he admitted 
Starbuck could have told him it was ten days (James R. 
Wickes' deposition, page 19). In any event, he made no 
claim that Starbuck told him it could be paid later than 
10 days or certainly 18 days after the expiration date. 
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If Agent Starbuck is believed, then there cannot pos-
sibly be a waiver since he advised plaintiff's representa-
tive, James Wickes, that the premium had to be paid 
within the ten days or no coverage. This would have 
been the very opposite of State Farm's waiving prompt 
payment which the plaintiff now claims it did. Even if 
Starbuck' s testimony is not believed or disregarded, there 
is still no basis for waiver since James Wickes admits he 
knew the premium was then overdue and neither Starbuck 
nor anyone else with State Farm led him to believe that if 
they waited to August 18th to pay the premium, that there 
would be continuous coverage. 
The next contact that Starbuck or anyone else from 
State Farm had with the Wickes after this August 4th 
telephone conversation was Starbuck's receipt in the mail 
on August 18th of James Wickes' letter dated August 13th 
mailed from Phoenix on August 16th and enclosing his 
mother's check. Plaintiff argues that by accepting this 
check, State Farm somehow waived its right to have Mrs. 
Wickes bound by the terms of the policy that expired 
August 1st or else waived its right to allow continuous 
coverage but only if the premium was paid within ten 
days after the expiration date. One of the difficulties of 
this waiver argument of plaintif's is that it is premised 
on an incorrect factual assumption by which plaintiff 
would have us believe that she paid her $48 premium to 
State Farm on August 18th to be accepted only on the 
basis that she be granted continuous coverage retroactive 
to August 2nd. This is simply not the fact, and it is clear 
both from plaintiff's testimony and also from that of her 
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son, James R. Wickes, that what they wanted when they 
paid the $48 premium was to have vehicle insurance on 
the 1962 Olds for the future. Nothing was mentioned in 
James Wickes' letter accompanying his mother's check or 
otherwise which conditioned the premium's being paid 
on State Farm's granting retroactive coverage to August 
2nd as well as future coverage. This letter advised Star-
buck that the $48 check was enclosed for his mother's 
insurance on the '62 Olds and that the insurance should be 
issued in her name alone deleting his father's name (Affi-
davit of James G. Starbuck, and Exhibit "A" attached 
thereto). Moreover, the conversation of August 4th be-
tween Starbuck and James Wickes and also the manner in 
which the February 1969 renewal premium was handled 
could not reasonably have suggested to Starbuck that the 
premium was being tendered on that basis. To the con-
trary, it undoubtedly suggested to him that what Mrs. 
Wickes wanted was immediate coverage for the future on 
this '62 Olds she was driving to Arizona. The record is 
full of statements by James Wickes and particularly Mrs. 
Wickes that this is exactly what she did want and that she 
would have been upset had there been any delay on Star-
buck or State Farm's part in placing immediate coverage. 
James Wickes testified that at the time he mailed the 
premium that his mother was driving the Olds down there 
and needed all the coverages. He further testified that 
he was most concerned about getting the premium paid 
because he "wouldn't want the vehicle to be driven with-
out any insurance coverage" (James R. Wickes' depo-
sition, pages 27 and 31). 
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Mrs. Wickes was even more emphatic in her testi-
mony about her concern at this time in August, 1969 for 
future coverage. Mrs. Wickes said she wanted the "S 
Coverage" for $10,000 on her life so she "was covered in 
case anything happened to me for the children." (Betty 
Wickes' deposition, page 15). She also said she wanted 
public liability, collision and uninsured motorist coverage 
because she knew "it is not good to drive a car without 
being covered" (Betty Wickes' deposition, page 15). She 
was asked if her concern in paying the $48 premium was 
about "the 'S Coverage' that had been on there" (i.e. the 
coverage for the prior period which is involved in this 
litigation) and her answer was to repeat "I was concern-
ed about driving a car that was not covered" (Betty 
Wickes' deposition, pages 15 and 16). She testified she 
had told Agent Osborne on September 3rd, "Now, I don't 
want to take a chance, if I would be in an accident, that I 
would not be covered" (Betty Wickes' deposition, page 
14). Finally, she admitted in her deposition that she had 
wanted coverage in the future even though she was not 
also given retroactive coverage to August 2nd, because "I 
did not want to be uncovered at any time" (Betty Wickes' 
deposition, page 22). 
It is a little difficult to understand how State Farm 
can be said to have waived anything by accepting her 
money and giving her the very thing she wanted. This is 
so even though State Farm, through its Sales Agent James 
G. Starbuck, did know of the loss and Homer W. Wickes' 
death at the time he accepted the premium and sent it on 
to Greeley. However, this i:,Jio legal significance because 
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the premium was never applied or used for the period of 
the loss but was only applied for the future coverage she 
wanted. If State Farm had at any time applied any part 
of this $48 premium to a period before or at the time of 
the loss, even though it may later have refunded or tried 
to refund it, then we would be involved with a different 
legal principle and one that is involved in some of the 
cases plaintiff cites. 
Plaintiff contends that State Farm should not have 
accepted the $48 without first advising her or a member 
of her family that it was accepting the $48 check at a 
higher premium rate for a shorter period of time. Is it 
reasonable to expect that State Farm should have delayed 
in accepting the premium until it could have advised Mrs. 
Wickes or her family of these matters and perhaps ob-
tained a commitment from her that the premium was only 
being accepted for future coverage and not any past cov-
erage? It is impractical to have expected any insurance 
company to have done this under these facts, and it would 
only have delayed covering her which was the very thing 
she didn't want. Suppose Starbuck and State Farm had 
not immediately placed coverage and had delayed doing 
so for a few days, or more, to advise the Wickes of these 
matters or obtain this commitment and in the meantime 
Mrs. Wickes had suffered some other loss relating to this 
1962 Olds. Obviously, if such had occurred, State Farm 
would have been responsible and would have had no ex-
cuse for not immediately accepting the premium and plac-
ing coverage. 
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Plaintiff apparently finds some significance on this 
waiver argument in defendant's having kept the entire 
$48 without refund while still excluding 17 days from the 
six months renewal period. The uncontradicted evidence 
is that the premium rates were higher in Arizona where 
Mrs. Wickes elected to move and that based on those 
rates, she was not entitled to a refund (Affidavit of A. 
F. Smith, para. 4). Mrs. Wickes herself acknowledged that 
she knew the Arizona rates were higher than Utah's (Betty 
Wickes' deposition, page 19). No claim is made that the 
Arizona rates were unfair or that they were not the same 
charged everyone else in Arizona who fit in the same 
underwriting category. The amount of these premiums is 
regulated by law and by the insurance commissioners of 
the various states. It is simply an emotional argument to 
attempt to fault State Farm here for immediately placing 
coverage by accepting the premium and to contend that 
State Farm should have delayed placing coverage until it 
first advised Mrs. Wickes about the higher rates in Ari-
zona. 
Plaintiff in her brief also claims a waiver by reason 
of Agent Osborne's claimed statement to her in Arizona 
on September 3, 1969, when he is supposed to have told 
her that if she sent in the check at that time (this check 
was returned to her uncashed) that the coverage would be 
retroactive to August 2nd. The facts concerning Mrs. 
Wickes' chance meeting with Agent Osborne have been 
detailed above under Statement of Facts and won't be 
repeated here. However, it is perfectly obvious for sev-
eral reasons that this claimed representation made over 
one month after the policy had expired by a complete 
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stranger to whatever had occurred in Utah, cannot con-
stitute a waiver of State Farm's right to assert there was 
no coverage on August 2nd. If this kind of a representa-
tion can serve as a basis for waiver, then all an insured 
needs to do after his policy has expired and he has suffer-
ed a loss is to find some agent who will tell him he still 
has coverage or even if such an agent can't be found, the 
insured can assert this and raise a jury question. Presum-
ably, plaintiff would claim such a gratuitous statement 
can constitute a waiver if made a month, six months or a 
year after the expiration date. The law is clear that what 
Osborne is claimed to have said cannot serve as a waiver 
against State Farm. The insurance contract cannot be 
modified by an agent in this manner. See Sections 31-19-
18, 31-19-20 and 31-19-26, U.C.A., 1953, and also Barnett 
v. State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters, 487 P.2d 
311 (Utah 1971). The policy itself also provides that its 
terms may not be waived or changed except by a duly 
authorized policy endorsement (See para. 5 on page 8 of 
the policy). 
In her brief plaintiff cites a number of authorities 
which support the principle that an insurance company 
may waive a provision in its policy requiring payment of 
premium by a given date with the penalty for non-pay-
ment being expiration, lapse or forfeiture of the policy. 
Defendant has no quarrel that this can occur and under 
appropriate facts. The difficulty with the plaintiff's au-
thorities is that they are all clearly distinguishable on the 
facts from the instant case. Hereafter, defendant will 
refer to the authorities cited by the plaintiff and, as briefly 
as possible, point out wherein they are distinguishable. 
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Plaintiff relies upon Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life In-
surance Company of California, 114 P. 134 (Utah 1911). 
In this case as in most of those cited under Point III. by 
plaintiff, the loss has occurred and the insurance company 
thereafter accepts a premium covering the period which 
includes the loss and under circumstances where there is 
no need or desire for future coverage. In other words, the 
insurer on one hand has collected a premium for a period 
which includes the loss and on the other hand is trying to 
deny coverage for that period. Thus, in the Loftis case life 
insurance premiums were to be paid monthly by being 
deducted from the insured's wages and if not paid prompt-
ly, the insurance would lapse. The insured did not make 
sufficient wages in August and September to pay the 
premium and he was killed on October 14th. However, 
his October wages for the time prior to his death were 
sufficient to pay all three months and an amount to cover 
this was deducted from his wages and paid to the insur-
ance company after his death and with knowledge of it. 
These premiums were later refunded. 
The major distinction between the Loftis case and 
the instant case is clear. In Loftis, the insurance company 
accepted premiums for the period prior to and at the time 
of the loss under a policy that otherwise would have laps-
ed for nonpayment of these same premiums. In the in-
stant case, State Farm never at any time applied or charg-
ed any of the $48 premium to any period before August 
18th or which included the date of the August 2nd loss. 
From the beginning, State Farm took the premium and 
applied it only to future coverage. This case would be 
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apposite to the Loftis case and many of those cited in 
plaintiff's brief if State Farm had, after the acceptance of 
the $48 premium applied some of it to the period before 
it was received including the date of the loss. Also, even 
if State Farm had applied all of the premium as it did to 
future coverage and if this coverage had been unneeded 
or unwanted (as e.g. if the insured vehicle was destroyed, 
the insured was dead or another reason eliminating a need 
for future coverage) then an argument might be made that 
State Farm was inconsistently charging for coverage it 
deni~d existed. This is the pattern that runs through most 
of these cases cited by plaintiff on this point, and it is com-
pletely lacking in the instant case. 
Plaintiff cites as authorities Long, The Law of Liabil-
ity Insurance, Sections 17-42, and 43 Am. Jur. 2d Section 
1129. Here again, Long talks about "acceptance of un-
earned premiums," and the quote from Am. Jur. talks 
about retention of premiums "covering the period of de-
fault." These may be accurate statements of the law but 
they do not fit the facts of this case because the defendant 
accepted no unearned premium nor did it retain any pre-
mium covering the period of the default. 
Plaintiff cites Seavey v. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 889, 
244 Minnesota 232, 52 A.L.R. 2d 1144 (1955). The facts 
of these consolidated cases are somewhat complicated and 
will not be detailed here but a careful reading of these 
cases will show that the facts are radically different from 
this case. Among other grounds, the waiver of the insurer 
was predicated on the fact that the insurance company 
accepted and retained a premium on a vehicle which it 
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knew was totally destroyed. Also, and although there 
was some question about this, it appeared that the insured 
may actually have paid a premium for the period covered 
by the loss. Moreover, there were other facts involving 
the prior practice of the insurer in giving notice and col-
lecting premiums and also concerning its investigation of 
the accident to the insured vehicle and its obtaining of 
statements from its insured that weighed heavily in the 
court's decision and which are completely lacking in the 
instant case. The Seavey case does have the distinction 
of being the only one cited by plaintiff under Point III. 
that involves vehicle insurance. All the others involve 
other kinds of insurance and mostly life insurance. 
Also relied upon by plaintiff is Sullivan v. Benefi-
cial Life Insurance Company, 64 P.2d 351 (Utah 1937). 
Here again, this case is quite complicated factually but a 
a careful reading of it will show that it is not closely in 
point to the instant case. In the Sullivan case which in-
volved a life insurance policy with Beneficial, Sullivan 
had been insured for approximately 12 years but failed 
to make the quarterly payment that was due on October 
6, 1932, and he also failed to make it within the 31-day 
grace period thereafter which was provided by the policy. 
Thereafter, Beneficial sent notice to Sullivan indicating 
that his interest in the policy had lapsed and was forfeited 
but that he could reinstate it. Mrs. Sullivan also had con-
versations with various officials of Beneficial in which 
she claimed that they told her that they would not insist 
upon the grace period. On December 24, 1932, Beneficial 
accepted from Mrs. Sullivan the quarterly premium that 
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was due on October 6, 1932, and that would pay the policy 
current to January 6, 1933. Later, Beneficial tendered 
premium payment back to Mr. Sullivan and tried to claim 
that it had been accepted initially on conditions which 
were never conveyed to Mrs. Sullivan when it was accept-
ed. The holding of the Sullivan case is that the facts, in-
cluding those just mentioned, gave rise to a jury question 
as to whether Beneficial had waived forfeiture of the pol-
icy after the insured's failure to make the October 6, 1932 
quarterly premium payment or within the grace period 
thereafter. The essential difference in Sullivan as in 
Loftis from the instant case is that the insurer accepted a 
premium for the same period during which in the lawsuit 
it tried to claim there was no coverage and there had been 
a forfeiture because of non-payment of premium. This is 
simply not the fact in the instant case. 
Plaintiff cites Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co., 
227 P. 805 (Utah 1924). In this case a renewal certificate 
for a policy of health and accident insurance was mailed to 
plaintiff and the certificate indicated that the premium 
was to be paid by October 8, 1922 and, if paid, that the 
policy would continue in force for one year. The premium 
was $120 per year. Bills for the premium were sent for 
three months, but it was not paid. Thereafter and in De-
cember, 1922, a conversation was had between the insur-
ed and a representative of the insurance company in which 
the former inquired if the insured wished to keep the pol-
icy or should it be cancelled and the insured advised not 
to cancel it. On February 23, 1923 a partial payment of 
$60 was paid and was retained. On February 24, 1923 the 
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plaintiff went in to the hospital and it was conceded that 
the condition causing the hospitalization had existed be-
fore February 24, 1923. The issue therefore became 
whether there was coverage after October, 1922 and prior 
to February 24th of 1923. In Ellerbeck, the court found 
that there were sufficient facts by which the jury could 
have found (as it had) that the insurer or its authorized 
agents extended credit to the insured for the payment of 
the premium and that the plaintiff within the period of 
such credit accepted the extension of credit and paid the 
amount of the premium. This readily distinguishes that 
case from the instant one. Plaintiff in her brief attempts 
to draw some parallel between State Farm Agent Osborne 
in this case and the general agent or Continental Casualty 
Company in the Ellerbeck case. In the instant case the 
plaintiff had never dealt with Osborne until more than 
one month after the expiration of the policy. In the 
Ellerbeck case the insured had dealt with the general 
agent for several years and the court's holding was that 
this was the agent whom the jury could find had extended 
the insured credit to pay the premium. Also, the waiver 
by the agent in Ellerbeck was based on a course of dealing 
between himself and the insured for a substantial period 
prior to the loss. 
Parker v. California State Life Insurance Co., 40 P.2d 
175 (Utah 1935), also relied upon by plaintiff, is dis-
tinguishable from the instant case on the facts. In the 
Parker case the life insurance policy did lapse for non· 
payment of premium but the insurance company made an 
express offer to waive the lapse if certain conditions were 
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complied with by the insured, Parker. It is apparent from 
reading the opinion that Parker did everything necessary 
to comply with the waiver offered by the insurer and he 
did this by filling out and sending to the insurer on No-
vember 5th a form of reinstatement the insurer had pre-
pared together with a portion of the premium. Several 
days later and after his letter with this form and the pre-
mium had been received by the insurer, Parker was killed 
in an accident. The insurer learned of this and then at-
tempted to deny coverage and return the premium, but it 
is perfectly obvious from reading the facts of the case that 
the insurance company had waived the lapse and would 
have continued the policy in full force but for the com-
pletely fortuitous circumstances of the insured being kill-
ed after he had complied with the conditions imposed by 
the insurer. The facts are somewhat similar to those in 
Moore v. Prudential Insurance Co., No. 12388 (Utah 1971) 
decided within the last few weeks by this court, but they 
are certainly not analogous to those in the instant case. 
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance Co., 232 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1951) is also cited by plaintiff. It is diffi-
cult to see any relevance factually between the Farring-
ton case and the instant case or why it was cited. In the 
Farrington case the insurance was granted, the premiums 
were accepted, including a substantial portion after the 
loss and for the period of the loss, and then after the build-
ing was destroyed by fire, the insurance company attempt-
ed to defend primarily on the basis of some claimed mis-
representations which the court said were not material. 
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In American National Insurance Co. v. Cooper, 458 
P.2d 257 (Colo. 1969) cited by plaintiff, the insurance 
company sent the insured a letter requesting payment of 
his then overdue premium and, in effect, waiving any de-
fault if he would pay the premium. A loss then occurred 
in the form of injuries to the insured and the premium was 
then tendered for the period covering the loss and was ac-
cepted by the insurance company. At no time was this 
premium ever returned or offered to be returned to the 
insured. It was also apparent from the letter sent to the 
insured that the insurance company considered that the 
policy was still in force if the insured paid the premiums 
and that the insurer was not considering a reinstatement 
where the policy would be out of force for a period of 
time. This was reinforced when the insurer accepted and 
kept the premiums including for the period of time cov-
ered by the loss. The court held that under these circum-
stances and primarily by accepting and keeping the pre· 
miums with full knowledge of the loss, the insurer had 
waived its rights under the policy. 
Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 275 P.2d 675, 
2 Utah 2d 3 73 (Utah 1954) is a case somewhat in point to 
the instant case although the facts are substantially differ· 
ent. It is cited although not relied upon by plaintiff. In 
the Cooper case a medical policy was involved which ran 
from month to month and which contained a 31-day grace 
period. The principal issue resolved by the court in the 
Cooper case was whether the loss occurred and the pre· 
mium was paid within the grace period or after the grace 
period. The situation was that the accident giving rise to 
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the loss occurred in the afternoon of October 31st and 
the premium was paid that evening. The court held that 
the grace period had terminated at noon on the same date 
and the policy had lapsed at that time and the effect of the 
payment of the premium that evening was only to rein-
state the policy at that time. Thus the policy was out of 
force at the time the loss occurred. One contention made 
by the plaintiff in the Cooper case was that the insurer 
had waived its rights to demand payment in advance of 
premiums by accepting premiums late at other times. The 
court considered this argument and acknowledged that 
an insurer "which, by any course of conduct, induces in 
the mind of the insured an honest belief, reasonably 
founded, that strict compliance with a stipulation for 
prompt payment of premiums will not be insisted on, 
waives the right to a forfeiture for non-payment." How-
ever, the court rejected the argument of Mrs. Cooper and 
said that "there were no acts on the part of the [insurer} 
which could be regarded as inconsistent with the contract 
nor as inducing a belief that the [insurer} did not intend 
to enforce the terms thereof." 
Defendant has been unable to find any authorities 
that are closely in point to the instant case and which sup-
port plaintiff's theory of waiver. There simply is no basis 
for such an argument in this case where not even a claim 
is made of any acts or conduct on the part of defendant, 
State Farm, which occurred prior to August 10th and 
which could support a waiver. After that date and on 
August 18th, the premium was accepted and a new policy 
was issued but this was the very thing plaintiff wanted. 
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CONCLUSION 
POINT I. 
The death indemnity involved here, called "S Cov· 
erage", is not life insurance but is vehicle insurance by 
reason of the express provisions of a Utah statute (31· 
11-6 U.C.A., 1953). As vehicle insurance, there is no 
"grace period" required by law and since the policy of 
insurance did not provide for one, none existed in the 
present case. 
POINT II. 
The policy expired on August 1, 1969, and the loss 
occurred on August 2nd. By notice sent three days after 
August 1st, the defendant offered plaintiff the right to 
have continuous coverage, including on the date of loss, 
if the premium was paid by August 10th. On August 4th, 
plaintiff's son was orally advised of this offer by State 
Farm's Agent Starbeck. No payment of premium was 
made until August 18th or eight days after the offer had 
expired. The ten days was not a "grace period" but mere· 
ly a period during which the defendant made plaintiff an 
offer which the plaintiff failed to accept. 
POINT III. 
The policy expired on August 1, 1969, and prior to 
the accident and loss which occurred on August 2nd. 
Plaintif contends that State Farm or its representatives 
did something that constituted a waiver of its right under 
the policy to be paid the premium on time. The facts 
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claimed by plaintiff fail to support any such theory of 
waiver. As stated under Point II., State Farm did offer the 
plaintiff the chance for continuous coverage if the pre-
mium was paid by August 10th. This was not done and the 
premium was mailed August 16th and received August 
18th. On the latter date, State Farm issued a new policy 
to plaintiff and commenced immediately the coverage she 
wanted. No premium was ever applied or charged to 
August 2nd or anytime before the premium was received. 
This is an unfortunate case but there is absolutely nothing 
in this record to support a claim that State Farm waived 
its rights or was responsible for the premium being paid 
late. 
The Summary Judgment granted by the lower court 
of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as against the de-
fendant should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
STRONG & HANNI 
BY------------------------------------------------
DAVID K. WINDER 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going brief to Allan L. Larson at 7th Floor Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah on this ... s1L .. day 
of December, 1971. 
DAVID K. WINDER 
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